Theory tells us that weak rule of law and institutions deter cross-border integration, deter investment relative to trade, and inhibit trade finance. Drawing on a survey of more than 300 Chinese enterprises that are doing or have done business in North Korea, we consider how informal institutions have addressed these problems in a setting in which rule of law and institutions are particularly weak. Given the apparent reliance on hedging strategies, the rapid growth in exchange witnessed in recent years may prove self-limiting, as the effectiveness of informal institutions erode and the risk premium rises. Institutional improvement could have significant welfare implications, affecting the volume, composition, and financial terms of cross-border exchange.
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History provides fascinating examples of traders who managed to organize institutions to support exchange in the absence of state protection of property rights and contracting, even over long distances (Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990; Greif 1993; Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast 1994; Clay 1997a, b) . Such examples are not limited to the past, the development and comparative economics literature yields a number of contemporary examples, from trans-African trade (Kennedy 1988) to the emergence of contracting and informal dispute settlement mechanisms in transitional economies such as Vietnam (McMillan and Woodruff 1999a, b) . Yet the informal institutions required to support an efficient level of trade are also demanding. Merchants must be able to act collectively both to protect themselves and to impel the sovereign to abjure expropriation, to the ultimate benefit of both the traders and the sovereign.
There is now ample empirical evidence that weak institutions have quantitatively significant effects on cross-border exchange. Using a gravity model, Anderson and Marcoullier (2002) find that corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce international trade. A 10 percent rise in a country's index of transparency and impartiality leads to a 5 percent increase in import volumes ceterus paribus. Cross-border investment may be even more sensitive to such considerations: Wei (2000) found that an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico had the same negative effect on inward foreign direct investment (FDI) as raising the tax rate by 50 percentage points. While private actors may be able to devise mechanisms to offset weak institutions, the level of exchange will be suboptimal and institutional improvements could have significant payoffs.
Economic integration between China and North Korea represents a remarkable natural experiment for exploring these issues. Traditionally, trade between the two centrally planned economies was determined politically and was relatively small. The breakup of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and the apparent inability of the North Korean leadership to adjust to changing circumstances contributed to an implosion of North Korea's economy and a famine that killed as many as one million people-around 5 percent of the pre-crisis population (Haggard and Noland 2007) .
The inability of the state to provide food under the existing socialist compact forced small-scale social units-households, work teams, local government and party offices, even military units-to engage in entrepreneurial behavior to secure food.
One aspect of this coping behavior was the development of decentralized cross-border barter trade for food. This barter was eventually monetized and spread to a much broader array of both goods and actors. This "marketization from below" led to a dramatic expansion in bilateral trade (figure 1), but in a cross-border setting characterized by the apparent absence of conventional property rights protections, formal dispute adjudication mechanisms, even a published tariff schedule-in short, all of the institutions deemed necessary for efficient exchange.
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This paper is based on an unprecedented survey of more than 300 Chinese enterprises that are doing or have done business in North Korea. The results provide some insight both into how firms manage the risks associated with weak institutions and the particular constraints such weaknesses place on bilateral trade and investment. On the one hand, Chinese firms are adopting contracts and trading mechanisms that are self-enforcing, i.e., do not require third-party government enforcement. On the other hand, we document that these strategies have costs, visible in the scale and nature of firm operations and other crucial elements of exchange such as the willingness to extend credit.
There are basically two sorts of Chinese enterprises doing business in North Korea: large stateowned enterprises with long-standing relationships with their North Korean counterparts, and a larger number of small, essentially private businesses (regardless of their specific legal status in China) that restrict themselves primarily to trading activities. The majority of firms in our survey-nearly 90 percent-report being able to make a profit in North Korea. Moreover, their assessments of the future at the time of the survey were generally positive; most respondents indicated that they regarded the trend toward liberalization as irreversible. 1 Nonetheless, Chinese appraisals of the North Korean business environment are generally negative and manifest fear of expropriation of investments made in North Korea. A large majority of the respondents complain about infrastructure issues-most notably the historic ban on cell phone use which is beginning to ease-but respondents also complain about the nature of the regulatory environment, the risk of arbitrary changes in rules and practices and lack of reliable dispute adjudication. As a result, Chinese enterprises limit their exposure by generally choosing trading over investing, conducting transactions in China, holding their North Korean counterparts to tight settlement terms, and demanding payment primarily in US dollars or Chinese yuan.
Bribery and corruption are pervasive features of the business environment, and might be seen as a rational response to the lack of property rights protection. If bribe payments result in credible provision of protection, they are one political mechanism for assuring trade and investment. However, there is some evidence that firms face a greater likelihood of economic predation as their size increases. The limited scale of Chinese operations and the reluctance of firms to invest or even to engage in anything more than spot market transactions appears to stem directly from the absence of property rights protection and pervasive corruption.
In the absence of formal institutions for dispute settlement, there is some evidence that Chinese businesses may seek to protect themselves from official predation via informal networks of other firms. Recourse to other firms rather than either North Korean or Chinese authorities may constitute an example of how private traders can use reputational mechanisms to protect themselves. But it is again important to emphasize the suboptimal nature of these arrangements; most firms that have had disputes with their counterparties report a low level of satisfaction with the outcome.
In sum, institutional weakness deters integration, deters investment relative to trade, and inhibits normal trade finance. Given the weakness of formal institutions and the corresponding limits on the risks Chinese firms are willing to take, the rapid growth in exchange that we have seen in recent years may prove self-limiting if the effectiveness of informal institutions erodes. Institutional improvement would clearly have significant welfare implications, affecting the volume, composition, and financial terms of cross-border exchange.
WHo Are tHe PArticiPANtS?
The results reported here are derived from a survey of 303 enterprises conducted in October and November 2007. All the firms in the survey operated in the Chinese provinces of Jilin and Liaoning, although they were not necessarily headquartered there. (Details of the survey implementation are provided in the appendix.) Two hundred and fifty of the firms (82 percent) were engaged in trade or investment with North Korea at the time of the survey. As there are no public business registries listing firms engaged in business with North Korea, the firms necessarily constitute a sample of convenience, culled from a variety of sources. However, extensive interviews suggest that the sample is broadly representative of the cross-border business.
These firms are engaged in importing, exporting, investment and the permutations and combinations of these three activities (figure 2). Nonetheless, pure exporters make up the largest group.
Most are relatively small private enterprises (figure 3), and most have initiated cross-border exchange with North Korea since 2000 (figure 4). However there is a distinct minority of a dozen large stateowned enterprises (SOEs), some of which have been doing business with North Korea for more than a quarter-century.
We also surveyed a control group of 53 firms drawn randomly from firms operating in the two provinces which were not doing business in North Korea at the time of the survey; 43 (14 percent) had never engaged in cross-border exchange with North Korea, and a small share (10 firms, or 3 percent of the total sample) had previously engaged in trade or investment but had withdrawn. There are a number of salient differences between the firms that are not doing business in North Korea and those that are, starting with size. Of those doing business in North Korea, 55 percent have 1-10 employees and 91 have 100 or less. The point is even clearer if we focus on revenue: 28 percent of firms doing business in North Korea had sales revenues of less than 100,000 renminbi, around $12,000. Most of the firms 5 doing business with North Korea are clearly small entities. By contrast, 42 percent of the firms not doing business in North Korea had more than 100 employees. Six-11 percent of the sample of 53-have more than 1000 employees and 13-nearly a quarter of them-report sales revenues of more than 50 million renminbi, about $6 million.
Ownership patterns also vary. Fifty-eight percent of the firms doing business in North Korea are private enterprises, and another 14 percent are sole proprietorships; only 3 percent are foreign.
By contrast, the not-doing-business sample includes a different mix of ownership structures, with 38 percent foreign firms and only 28 percent accounted for by private enterprises and sole proprietorships.
Interestingly, there were not many SOEs in either sample (5 percent in the "doing business" sample, 4 percent in the "not doing business" sample) although joint stock companies-which frequently have The traders were asked about the most important product that they exchanged with their largest customer or supplier. The findings comport broadly with what we know about bilateral trade at the time of the survey from aggregate trade data. For exporters, the major products included construction materials (including upholstery; 13 percent), apparel and clothing (11 percent), grain and edible oils (10 percent), and chemicals and electrical equipment (8 percent each). On the import side, the product mix is much more concentrated, with aquatic products accounting for nearly 30 percent of major products from major suppliers, with metal and metal products (27 percent) and wood and wood products (18 percent) accounting for significant shares; indeed, these three product categories together account for almost 75 percent of the top imports from the dominant supplier.
Among investors, the most frequently cited motivations are to expand business in the domestic market (29 percent), to sell there (21 percent), or to exploit natural resources (27 percent). Only 23 percent are locating in North Korea as an export platform, either back to China (13 percent) or to third markets (10 percent). We interpret these results to reflect in part weak infrastructure, but also prevailing policies and incentives that limit opportunities for export-oriented investment.
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The vast majority of the enterprises in the sample doing business in North Korea are Chinese (98 percent), though around 20 percent of the control group report being headquartered outside of China, mostly in Japan or South Korea. Forty percent of the respondents report that their chief executive officer (CEO) can speak Korean. This share is virtually identical across both the firms currently doing business in North Korea and those which are not.
While our understanding of the Chinese participants is relatively complete, our understanding of their North Korea counterparts is much weaker. Figure 5 Respondents do see some positives in the operating environment. Among the firms doing business in the country, a slight majority believe that it is getting easier to do business in North Korea. 4 About 50 percent cite the reduction in trade barriers and the emergence of general markets as positive features in the operating environment. It is possible that at the time of the survey, the business environment was improving because of progress on the nuclear issue during 2007 and the announcement and staging of a second North-South summit just prior to the survey. It may also be the case that learning takes place:
agreement with the statement that North Korean regulations make it hard to do business is negatively correlated (at the 10 percent level) with length of involvement with North Korea.
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However, we also asked the firms doing business in North Korea a series of ten questions about the factors that impede their business (figure 6). Most firms report problems with infrastructure; large majorities indentify the ban on cell phones (86 percent) and inadequate infrastructure (79 percent) as constraints. However, regulation is also a major hindrance, with 79 percent citing changing regulations, 70 percent citing the nature of regulations, and just over 60 percent reporting that it is impossible to do business outside the special economic zones and that there is expropriation risk.
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We can assess the effects of these perceptions on entry by comparing the attitudes of those doing business in North Korea with those not doing business there, using simple t-tests. Perceptions on some issues do not exhibit significant differences between the two sets of firms; firms of both sorts have similarly negative assessments along these dimensions. For example, perceptions of the quality of infrastructure and barriers posed by weak telecommunications do not show significant differences. However, there are statistically significant differences in their views of North Korea's institutional environment. Firms not doing business are more likely to report that the depreciating currency poses a barrier to their business (at the 1 percent level), but are also more likely to see high taxes and the regulatory environment (at the 1 percent level) and the perceived difficulty of doing any business outside the special economic zone (at 5 percent level) as barriers. Perceptions of a problematic business environment potentially deter entry.
The trading firms doing business in North Korea are more likely to agree (at the 5 percent level)
with the statement that is it too risky to invest because of potential expropriation, suggesting that such 4. As noted earlier, a number of changes have occurred in North Korean economic policy since the survey was conducted and it is not known whether the respondents still hold these views.
5. This finding held for all those doing business and the subsample of traders, though not for investors.
6. Since the survey was conducted, the ban on cell phones has been lifted with the Egyptian firm Orascom introducing domestic cellular service through most of the country (Noland 2009 ). Whether the foreign firms' needs for international connections have been fully addressed is unknown.
8 fears push firms away from investment and toward trading modalities. Likewise compared to those not doing business, investors complain even more frequently (at the 5 percent level) than traders about high taxes (at the 10 percent level), which could be interpreted broadly as a proxy for government-related costs of doing business.
corruPtioN, DiSPute reSoLutioN, AND SettLeMeNt terMS
The survey provides evidence of the business environment in North Korea that goes beyond subjective assessments to corruption, the weakness of dispute resolution and the effects of the environment on the terms of financial settlement. The findings on corruption are consistent with evidence from refugee surveys, including testimonies of former state and party officials, of high-and possibly rising-levels of corruption in North Korea, Noland 2010b, Kim 2010 ).
Most of the Chinese firms report that they are required to get permission or approval from some level of the North Korean government to do business in North Korea, though there are differences across types of firms. All of the Chinese SOEs report having obtained permission before starting a business, but 29 percent of the private businesses report that they did not obtain any permission or approval by the North Korean government. Only 9 percent of investors-six firms-report that they have no need of government approval. By contrast 29 percent of traders and 47 percent of those who are engaged only in exports to North Korea report that they have no need of government approval to operate.
A majority of the firms in our survey report a need to bribe to do business (55 percent). However, investors are much more likely to report a need to bribe (73 percent) than traders (54 percent) or those engaged in exporting only (44 percent); these differences between investors, traders and exporters are significant at the 1 percent level. We also asked about actual bribe costs, and the differences between investors and traders are once again clear. Nineteen percent of the firms report spending more than 10 percent of revenues on bribes, but more than half of investors (53 percent) report spending more than 10 percent of annual revenues on bribes. These differences presumably reflect the greater complexity of entering as an investor, the more extensive contact with local officials, and the greater risk of expropriation.
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A critical feature of the institutional environment is the capacity of investors and traders to resolve disputes. The survey permitted respondents engaged in multiple types of business to characterize each of 7. This pattern of response appears to be borne out of experience. The responses are similar for the quitters; they do not appear to have distinctly harsh views of North Korea. Among the firms that had never done business in North Korea, most were uncertain about the need to bribe to do business; 37 percent thought that bribery was necessary and 12 percent did not. The firms never having done business in North Korea had lower perceptions of the incidence of bribery at the 5 percent level of statistical significance.
their principal business relationships separately, for example, allowing a single firm to report on relations with its main import, export, and investment partner.
Disputes appear to be fairly common. Twenty-one percent of these relationships had generated disputes. The pattern of disputes was fairly uniform across types of business relationships: exporters (19 percent), importers (24 percent), and investors (23 percent). But if we compare investors with those who export only, we once again see evidence of the hold-up problem. Fully 41 percent of investors report disputes, while only 4 percent of exporters do. Weak dispute settlement appears to push firms back to less risky, "cash and carry" transactions.
When asked how they would resolve a dispute, the pattern of responses across exporters, importers and investors differed in predictable but interesting ways; we focus here on the differences between exporters and investors. More than one-quarter of exporters indicated that there were no third parties from which they could seek help. To the extent that they did believe there was recourse, it was entirely on the Chinese side of the border: Twenty percent indicated that they would seek help from Chinese government officials, 19 percent would look to other Chinese companies or business associations, and 17 percent would use the Chinese court system. 8 Although the number of disputes reported on the part of pure exporters was small (only 5 of 113 pure exporters), their pessimism was warranted; none of the five reported they were satisfied with the process of dispute resolution.
For the investors, more than one-third would try to settle matters privately (35 percent), 31 percent would appeal to North Korean local officials, and 22 percent to Chinese officials, presumably reflecting the far greater importance of North Korean officials in settling investment disputes that involve the foreign investor's physical presence in North Korea. It is also notable that the share reporting that they would appeal to local officials (31 percent) exceeded that of provincial officials (16 percent) and central government officials (12 percent). This pattern is consistent with a reduction in de facto central control that was a byproduct of "marketization from below," but it may also reflect the fact that investors see local officials as more forthcoming.
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Whatever the investors thought ex ante, their disaffection after the fact is high; 77 percent report that they were not satisfied with the way their dispute was settled (and recall that the share of investors reporting disputes was also much higher than firms involved in export only). When asked about how they 8. Multiple responses for dispute resolution modalities were permitted. If the modality figures are calculated as a share of total responses (not number of enterprises), the exports results are Chinese government officials (13 percent), other Chinese firms or business association (12 percent), and Chinese courts (11 percent). For imports the results are private negotiation (23 percent), North Korean local officials (12 percent), and Chinese officials (9 percent). For investors the results were private negotiation (21 percent), local North Korean officials (18 percent), and Chinese officials (13 percent).
In no case did the North Korean court system's share of responses reach 10 percent.
9. In the past year the North Korean government has tried to reverse this trend, specifically centralizing the foreign investment approval process.
would settle disputes in the future, respondents suggest that local and provincial officials may be more willing to protect property rights than their higher ups. Investors who experienced disputes showed a greater proclivity to pursue resolution of future disputes through appeals to local officials ( hold-up risk, as it does in a market economy as well. We would therefore expect the property rights, contracting and regulatory environment to matter more to investing firms.
Probit regressions estimated on entry are summarized in table 1. Ownership type and size matter. As shown in specification 1.1, private ownership is positively associated with entry, and size, as measured by number of employees, is negatively associated with entry. This relationship is specified slightly differently in specification 1.2 with a similar result: firms choosing to engage in business with North Korea are smaller and more likely to be private than their counterparts.
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With respect to business activity, service providers are deterred from entry. This could be because of North Korean regulations that create explicit entry barriers, but it could also be because service activities require a local presence which is more risky than arms-length trade transactions.
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Also of interest is what does not appear to matter. Variables relating to enterprises' sources of funding were statistically uncorrelated with entry. In regressions not reported in the interests of brevity, neither provincial location of the firms' headquarters nor having a headquarters in a border town are statistically significant. Nor is having a chief executive officer (CEO) who speaks Korean. These characteristicsproximity and language skills-might be associated with being more informed about the North Korean business environment or the ability to make more nuanced risk assessments, yet they neither incline firms toward or away from doing business.
We would like to know how ex ante appraisals of the North Korean business environment affect the likelihood of entry, but we face a specification problem in teasing this out of our survey data. The 260 enterprises with current or past experience in North Korea have appraisals that are informed by experience ex post. Econometrically, the values of these regressors may not be predetermined, violating the classical assumption of the independence of the error term and rendering the coefficient estimates inconsistent.
With this caveat acknowledged, specification search suggested that there were three of these variables correlated with entry: views regarding the falling value of the North Korean currency and high taxes (negatively) and ability to make a profit (positively). As shown in table 1, there is some evidence that the responses on taxes and profitability are correlated with entry holding firm characteristics constant.
Enterprises that believe that taxes are too high are deterred from entry and those expecting to make profits enter. If we were able to observe true ex ante assessments of the business environment, the list could well be longer.
One particular null finding deserves mention. The perception or knowledge of the necessity for bribery to do business with North Korea was uncorrelated with entry. Approximately 70 percent of both firms that entered and did not enter North Korea believed that bribery was necessary to do business in the country; this information did not constitute a deterrent. As we will see below, however, there is evidence that the respondents' ex ante assessments may have underestimated the actual extent of corruption in North Korea.
We are not only interested in whether these enterprises enter the North Korean market but how they do so. There are seven modality combinations (export only, export and invest, export and import, etc.) and our sample contains some enterprises in each cell. In principle we could model this as an 10. That said, North Korea's largest private investment has been by the Egyptian cellular telephone operator Orascom in a joint venture with a North Korean government entity (Noland 2009 Having a Korean-speaking CEO is uncorrelated with investing (as it was with entry). But having a headquarters in a border town is actually negatively correlated with investing once firm characteristics are taken into account. If we take proximity as a proxy for information, knowing more about North Korea appears to deter investment.
We noted with respect to entry that knowledge of the necessity to bribe was not a deterrent.
By contrast, expectations of the need to bribe were positively correlated with investing (though the relationship is statistically insignificant in the table 2 regressions). For the reasons of simultaneity outlined above, these results should not be given a causal interpretation (i.e., bribery does not lead to more investment). Nonetheless, the results are intriguing. They suggest that firms which have invested in local operations and developed a more extensive understanding of the North Korean economy have a more keen appreciation of the ubiquity of corruption (and the inadequacy of infrastructure) than their presumably less well-informed peers.
Finally, we added four variables relating to expectations about dispute resolution. Does the perceived ability to resolve disputes through different channels influence the decision to invest? We aggregated the 12 possible modalities for dispute resolution into four key types: informal North Korean resolution through direct appeals to North Korean officials; formal North Korean resolution through the courts;
official Chinese resolution, including through both the courts and political appeals; and informal resolution through Chinese third party networks such as industry associations. The coefficients are relative to an omitted category that is defined by completely private informal dispute resolution such as direct bilateral negotiation.
The results reported in table 2 are quite interesting. The expectation that one could appeal to North
Korean officials for dispute resolution is positively associated with investing. Citing formal adjudication through the courts has no impact. Likewise, the expected availability of Chinese dispute resolution mechanisms, while possibly valuable in the case of trade, have no impact on the decision to invest; this makes sense given that Chinese officials are likely to have influence over investments in North Korea only 13 where they are very large and engage the political leadership directly. Finally, the expectation of having to rely on informal Chinese third party mechanisms is negatively associated with actually investing.
Whatever benefits these networks may have, they are-probably rightly-not seen as providing recourse in investment disputes.
In the interests of completeness, in table 3 we report results on exit. Statistically this is quite challenging insofar as we have only 10 firms in the data set that quit North Korea. Manufacturing firms are more likely to have quit the North Korean market after entering. If one controls for size, SOEs are more likely to quit, but this result is fragile.
In sum, investment is done by larger firms, possibly with external finance although this finding is not robust. Potential investors who believe that they can make direct appeals to North Korean officials to resolve disputes are more likely to commit. Belief in the ability of Chinese authorities to come to the support of firms facing disputes has no effect on investment. Although China-North Korea trade is often treated as highly political, the firms that have invested appear to recognize that they are on their own.
They have possibly learned that the infrastructure is even worse than expected and the need to engage in bribery even greater. But they appear to have accepted the latter as it is an integral part of the operating environment, believing that the benefits of bribery in terms of securing political connections and support outweigh its financial costs.
reguLAtioN AND corruPtioN
Once firms enter and invest, the operating environment is adversely affected by both macroeconomic policy (the depreciation of the exchange rate; perceived tax rates) and the inadequacy of physical infrastructure. But some of the problems firms face clearly relate to the nature of the regulatory environment, arbitrary and capricious changes in policy and the consequent need to bribe public officials in order to conduct business. What firms are most adversely affected by these constraints and what are their strategies for dealing with them? Table 4 reports regressions on a question about whether regulations make it hard to conduct business in North Korea; 70 percent of the surveyed enterprises agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. The results are reported in two forms. In specifications 4.1 and 4.2, the dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that regulations were a problem. In specifications 4.3 and 4.4, the values of the dependent variable run from 1 (totally disagree) to 4 (totally agree) and the regressions are estimated using an ordered probit estimator.
In both cases, a positive coefficient is associated with greater sensitivity to regulatory obstacles.
Many of the results with respect to firm characteristics are subtle and possibly not robust. Even so, they suggest that despite the fact that small firms are more likely to enter, and despite the fact that they 14 engage in activities that reduce risk, such as focusing solely on exports and avoiding contact with officials, they are nonetheless more likely to find the regulatory environment a problem. Small, private firms appear particularly sensitive (4.2, 4.4); medium-sized firms (measured by sales) appear advantaged relative to small firms (4.1, 4.3). SOEs appear relatively untroubled (4.1), which may reflect size or the ability of such firms to draw on their political connections in order to operate.
One apparently robust result is that enterprises that have expected to be able to avail themselves to Chinese dispute settlement mechanisms appear disillusioned. There is evidence in specifications 4.1 and 4.2, that firms with the expectation of using the North Korean court system have relatively positive assessments of the business environment, though this result does not hold up in the ordered probit specifications. It is not clear whether these expectations are informed by experience.
A second cut at this issue can be taken by examining the determinants of responses to a question about whether fears of expropriation make it too risky to invest (table 5) . We again obtain the result that small or small private firms are more likely to agree, fearing predation. There is some evidence that firms that expect to need to engage in bribery are uniquely concerned about expropriation, as are enterprises headquartered in border towns, suggesting that such fear may be borne of knowledge. As in the previous results regarding investment, enterprises expecting to rely on Chinese authorities for dispute resolution appear to understand that such channels will be ineffective once in North Korea and are apprehensive of expropriation, while firms that believe that they can rely on North Korean political connections are less concerned about expropriation risk.
A pervasive response to the weakness of the property right regime is to engage in bribery.
Regressions on the propensity to bribe are reported in table 6. Again, they are reported as both simple and polychotomous ordered probits. We find that firms engaged in trading, which involves the least exposure to North Korea and indeed can be conducted within China, feel less compulsion to bribe. But there is also some evidence that despite the fact that smaller firms have more adverse views of the business environment and are more likely to fear expropriation, larger firms perceive a greater need to bribe; this is evidenced by the statistical significance of three of the four employment dummy variables in specifications 6.1 and 6.3, and the statistically significant negative coefficient on the small, private firm status in 6.2.
One interpretation of this result is that the North Korean state is predatory and larger firms make more attractive targets and thus face more substantial hold-up problems. Once an operation reaches a certain size, North Korean officials begin to prey upon it. This is consistent with other evidence of economically predatory behavior by the state apparatus (Haggard and Noland 2011) . In the extreme, the size of operations could well be endogenous to predation; the small size of firms doing business with
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North Korea, as well as the nature of their operations, is a result of the constraints placed on firm growth by the prospects of bribery.
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Again, perceptions of recourse to dispute settlement are interesting. Enterprises that believe that they can appeal to either Chinese or North Korean official institutions to manage disputes show no less likelihood to believe in the necessity of bribery to conduct business. The one apparently robust result is that that those firms that believe they have recourse to informal Chinese third-party dispute settlement are less likely to report a need to bribe to conduct business. One interpretation is that if a firm is embedded in an informal network, the association or network may deter predation. Such networks may act like a reputational mechanism that raises the costs to North Korean officials of extorting individual firms.
12 coNcLuSioN This paper has used an unprecedented survey of Chinese businesses operating in North Korea to explore the nature of growing cross-border ties in a setting characterized by weak institutions and property rights protections in particular. The Chinese enterprises generally have negative appraisals of the North Korean business environment, with large majorities invoking not only the inadequacy of the physical infrastructure but the problematic nature of the regulatory environment. In response these firms have adopted various strategies to reduce risk, including limiting their activity to trading and to exporting in particular;
these transactions involve less exposure to North Korea and can even be undertaken in China. Such strategies are particularly prevalent among small and small private enterprises and firms that do not believe that they can call upon political connections in North Korea. Transactions are undertaken in ways that suggest limited trust, including not only settlement in hard currencies but very stringent payment terms and limited credit, in effect "cash-and-carry."
Bribery and corruption are common. There is some evidence that the likelihood of predation is correlated with size, which could add a self-limiting aspect to the expansion of cross-border integration.
Firms may limit the scale of involvement in order to fly beneath the radar of a predatory state.
The survey indicates that Chinese firms receive little support from the government, and have a limited belief in the ability of their government to protect them in the face of disputes. In the absence of 11. Specification searches suggested that firms engaged in services and construction are unusually prone to bribery, though the evidence presented in table 6 is not compelling on that point. This could possibly relate to the greater propensity for enterprises in these business lines to require a local presence to conduct operations.
12. An alternative way of looking at these is that the results on dispute settlement (and the suggestive though statistically insignificant results for service and construction firms) are simply proxies for investment. When status as an investor is added to the specification, the statistical significance of dispute settlement and sectoral activity variables indeed disappears (6.5-6.8). The result that size is correlated with the propensity to bribe holds up, however.
formal institutions, there is some evidence that Chinese businesses may seek to protect themselves from predation via informal networks capable of imposing reputational penalties on North Korean actors.
As cross-border integration proceeds, presumably so does the number of participants and the effective degree of anonymity. Such a development could erode the effectiveness of reputation-based sanctions. Unless the increased density of participants strongly promotes the formation of voluntary associations (or induces the state to intervene) the ability of the network to identify and sanction those who violate contracts may not keep pace with the rise of anonymity. This raises the possibility of another self-limiting aspect of the growth of cross-border exchange, as the risk premium on doing business in North Korea rises unless offset by a concomitant strengthening of formal or informal institutions.
There are clearly gains to be had from stronger institutions in North Korea, not only in the volume of trade and investment but in an expansion of its scope beyond smaller traders and connected SOE's.
Intriguing in this context is recent formation of a North Korean supra-cabinet body to oversee foreign direct investment approvals under a 10-year plan announced in January 2011. The positive interpretation of this development is that this body could potentially constitute a one-stop shop for investment approval and put a stop to the cascading corruption that our survey results indicate deters investment.
Alternatively, the composition of this group could also be read as a map of the regime's internal political economy, specifically the organizations and factions best positioned to benefit from the extraction of rents from foreign investors. Reputation is not established by passing laws or even creating new institutions, but through the iterated play between state and economic agents that takes place over time. To date, the changeability of North Korean policy has prevented such a positive dynamic from emerging. was through face-to-face interviews, though some interviews were conducted by telephone. The success rate in conducting the interviews was around 7 percent. Among the reasons that interviews could not be conducted were refusal by the enterprise to participate prior to or during the interview, inability to establish contact with the enterprise, and the unavailability of the person within the enterprise eligible to respond according to the survey instrument (chairman, manager etc.). The data-and particularly firm addresses-were subject to post-survey verification by random spot-checking.
Given that there are no known or available registries of all Chinese firms doing business with North Korea, the sample of firms doing business with North Korea was of necessity a sample of convenience.
The sample was developed using North Korean, Chinese and Western press accounts, authors' interviews in Northeast China in the summer of 2007 as well as information gathered by the Horizon Group in the process of the pilot and interviews with other firms. The sample was drawn from enterprises operating in two border provinces-Jilin and Liaoning-due to the practical impossibility of implementing the survey on a nationwide basis, particularly with respect to the control group of firms not doing business in North Korea.
The design involved a survey of 300 firms, with 250 doing business in North Korea and 50 not doing business in North Korea; in the end, we had 53 responses from firms not doing business in North Korea. We defined firms doing business with North Korea to include those that were involved in trading (import, export or both), investment, or that maintained representative offices in North Korea. Those not doing business included 10 firms that had done business and had quit ("the quitters") and 43 that had never done business with North Korea ("the never-weres").
The survey began with a pilot of 30 firms from Jilin and Liaoning provinces (20 firms doing business in North Korea and 10 firms not doing business in North Korea). Although it was understood this was a sample of convenience, enterprises reflecting a broad distribution of size, sector, and provincial location were targeted. Following the successful completion of the pilot-which did not require fundamental modification of the survey-we were able to transit directly to the full survey and all of the pilot firms were included in the final 300 firms. Once the sample of 250 enterprises operating in North Korea was completed, the control group was selected by randomly sampling business registries for Jilin and Liaoning provinces. 
